Introduction
Remaining global conventional crude oil resources are on the order of 3 trillion barrels, with more than 50% of that amount in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, Persian Gulf oil has been of considerable interest to Western oil companies and governments (and to Russia) for more than a century. In earlier work in this journal, we argued that a target price range framework initiated in 1986 had resulted in stable crude oil prices and reliable supply. Western military support has been an important part of this framework, which constituted a Nash equilibrium between Gulf producers and Western (and Asian) consumers (see Chapman and Khanna, 2001 ).
Has the current war in Iraq destroyed the target price band arrangement? This paper attempts to answer that question by analyzing the interaction of politics and military security in the global oil market since the 1980s. With the very low cost of production in the region (about $5 per barrel) and the great magnitude of resources, the oil wealth in the Gulf is on the order of $75 trillion. We will argue that it is the existence of this wealth that creates a major policy problem for the eight countries in this region, and for global security. We will also argue that the framework that ensured a steady supply at mutually acceptable prices to the Persian Gulf producers and the Western consumers has itself contributed to growing instability in individual countries, and the rise of Al Qaeda and similar groups. We conclude the paper with an outline of a proposed road map for the future.
II. Brief History: Petroleum, the Persian Gulf, and the West
Today's issues with security and oil have long roots. Table 1 summarizes the colonial history of the Persian Gulf countries and the evolution to their current governments. Turkey's Ottoman Empire controlled most of the region at different periods over a 7-century span in the last millennium. The slow disintegration of the Empire was accelerated by the search for oil for naval vessels by Britain and France early in the 20 th Century. After the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, Britain obtained concessions in southern Iran whereas Russia sought to control the northern sphere. In the years after World War I (WWI), Britain created borders throughout the Persian Gulf that ensured easy access to oilfields and much of the oil in this region came under the production control of Western oil companies. Initially British Petroleum, CFP (Compangie Francaise de Petroles), and Royal Dutch/Shell dominated the region, reflecting the European concern for secure sources of petroleum. Russia and the Soviet Union also sought to establish their influence in the Persian Gulf but were mostly unsuccessful except for brief periods in Iran and Iraq. By the 1950's, however, American oil companies had become full partners. Figure 1 summarizes the composition of major oil production companies in 1972.
Virtually every country in the Persian Gulf region was under direct or indirect British control until the middle of the 20 th century. Of course WWII interrupted British dominance in the region, but in effect, between WWI and the 1950s, Britain maintained military security in the Persian Gulf region. Between the 1950s and 1990, there were several international events that influenced the relationship between the Persian Gulf producers and the Western consumers of oil. These include conflict over the Suez Canal, the OPEC oil embargo, and the Iran-Iraq war.
In 1986, OPEC and Western oil importers established the target price range arrangement, which continued into 2004 (see Figure 2 below and discussion). Throughout this period, there were minimal military security arrangements. It was only after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991 that the United States (and to a lesser extent, the United Nations) established a significant military presence in this region with a view to maintaining military security. Kinross (1977) , Kurian (1992) , Morris (2003) , Roosevelt (1979) , Sampson (1975 ), Yergin (1992 Source: Sampson (1975) , page 136.
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Against this historical backdrop, we can understand the evolution of the pricing structure in the global oil market. Due to their dominance in the region and low extraction costs, British
Petroleum and the European companies were a major factor in the global market that established real world oil prices at a few dollars per barrel during the first half of the 20 th century. With the emergence of American oil companies such as Aramco and other Figure 1 companies in the early 1950s, the market price was determined jointly by these companies. OPEC was established in 1960 to raise company-determined prices, but remained ineffectual for the first few years.
However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war created a surge of nationalism in the Arab world. OPEC nations, led by Saudi Arabia, seized the authority to control oil production within their countries.
Their efforts to raise oil prices were initially successful -oil prices reached nearly $40 per barrel -but had collapsed by 1986 with crude prices at $10 per barrel.
In 1986 then-Vice President George H. Bush went to the Persian Gulf and worked with the Saudi King and government to stabilize oil prices at a higher level (Yergin, 1992, pages 755-758) . The price range framework that was created in 1986 is essentially the price structure that 
III. The Tradeoff: Price Stability and Military Security
Between them, Persian Gulf countries have 75% of world's known reserves and more than 50% of the world's remaining resources of crude oil (see Table 4 ). At the same time, extraction costs are less than $5 per barrel Khanna, 2001, and Financial Times, 2003) . Why then don't these countries pursue a low-price policy that would increase their sales, market share, and possibly revenues? Conversely, why didn't they seek to earn higher profits by charging monopoly prices before 2004? The answer to these questions lies in the joint pay-offs under the price band arrangement to Persian Gulf producers, and also to the importers of Gulf oil in the West (see also Chapman and Khanna, 2001 ).
Production costs in the lower 48 states of the U.S. are around $15-20 per barrel, and about $25 per barrel in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge (Chapman, 2001) . When prices are below $15, crude oil production in the U.S., which has been steadily declining since the early 1970s, falls even more rapidly as high-cost facilities are shut down and drilling plummets.
American oil producers' revenues are affected twice: first by reduced production, and second by a lower price. Therefore, at very low oil prices, U.S. petroleum companies move to influence American policy to raise prices, as in 1986 and 1998.
In contrast, with very high oil prices, American consumers and oil-using businesses formerly dominated American policy. Congressmen from states without oil production called for termination or reduction of military support for Persian Gulf governments. American policy considered withdrawing military and political support of the Gulf governments at either extreme of the price spectrum. For the Persian Gulf producers, a long-term perspective is essential. Their economies are 1 The role of Congressmen from oil consuming states was evident in 2000 in a period of high prices (see New York Times March 2, 19, 23, & 29, 2000) . They were strongly critical of Gulf governments until prices declined. critically dependent on crude oil revenues and it was in their interest to keep prices within a range that ensures a healthy rate of extraction. If prices are "too low," Persian Gulf producers are likely to face domestic economic problems, even though world demand rises and their share in the global crude oil market is likely to rise as well. Conversely, when prices were "too high,"
American support for Gulf governments changed to criticism. At the same time, high prices act as a break on the economies of their key importers, and these Western governments then have an incentive to reduce oil consumption.
Furthermore, by maintaining a steady supply of oil at prices that are acceptable to Western countries, Persian Gulf governments ensure a critical quid pro quo from their Western allies. Assuming the average price over the remainder of this century is about $50 per barrel, the oil in the Persian Gulf region is worth about $75 trillion (see also Chapman and Khanna, 2004, Table 13 ). This enormous wealth can be a serious problem insofar as it creates an incentive for military action such as the Iraqi invasions of Iran and Kuwait. Military support from U.S. and European allies was crucial in turning back the 1990 invasion, and we see this military support as a major incentive to the Persian Gulf countries for maintaining crude oil prices within the target range before 2004. Khanna and Chapman (2004) have shown that during the eleven year period from 1989-1999, the relationship between arms trade and oil trade was extremely close. The world's largest crude oil exporters were the primary importers of conventional weapons, even after incorporating the influence of other factors such as the nature and strength of political and economic institutions, and the existence or potential for armed conflict.
IV. Military Security
Iraq's invasions of the oil regions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990) , if successful, would have gained for Iraq control of nearly half of known oil reserves and a fourth of total remaining resources (see Table 4 below). Success in these two invasions could have encouraged an Iraq influence, control, or occupation of the remainder of the Gulf countries. In this case, Iraq would have held three-fourths of known global reserves and one-half of remaining oil.
In reaction to these concerns, Persian Gulf governments undertook major military expansion in the 1990s. In the six years between 1994 and 1999, three Gulf countries --Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) --purchased a quarter of the global supply of conventional weapons, spending nearly $67 billion in weaponry (see Table 2 ). 2 The total population in these three countries was about 25 million. In other words, these three countries expended more than $2,500 per capita on arms and 13% of their Gross Domestic Product over this period (see Chapman and Khanna, 2004 , Table B7 , for population and GDP data on Persian Gulf countries). Seventeen of the nineteen September 11, 2001 hijackers were born in Persian Gulf countries. In addition, seven of the nine apparently highest-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda are from Saudi Arabia or its neighbors 
Saudi government is] supplying the United States with oil, according to their master's wish, so that their economy does not collapse."
Recent attacks against oil export facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iraq were apparently undertaken by groups operating independently of Al Qaeda, but influenced by a similar ideology. 
V. Global Oil Resources and the Persian Gulf; U. S. Imports
Total remaining resources are estimated to be 2.855 trillion barrels (see Table 3 ). This is the sum of three components. "Known Reserves" (similar in meaning to "Proved Reserves") are relatively firm values used in developing near-term production plans. It is the minimum amount of crude oil that is expected to be produced from a field or reservoir. "Potential Reserve Expansion" is a probabilistic concept and constitutes a best-guess estimate of additional future production beyond a proved reserves estimate at an existing site. As geological techniques have improved, potential reserve expansion has become more important in petroleum resource planning. For an existing field under production, remaining resources are the sum of "Known Reserves" and "Potential Reserve Expansion." "Undiscovered Resources" is a term used by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). It could be roughly translated as "approximate probability distribution estimates of oil resources in areas which have not been explored in detail." It is a category that relies on extrapolation. Suppose Area A is a region that has been producing for many years and has been extensively investigated. Known reserves are set at 500 million barrels. Area B is the same size with apparently identical geology. The undiscovered resource for Area B may have a mean estimate of the same 500 million barrel figure, with a 95% probability of at least 400 million barrels, and a 5% probability of 600 million barrels. Figure 3 shows the changing nature of the probability distributions for "Original Resources." 5 At every probability level, the estimates have increased. For the latest assessment, the range between high probability low resource estimates and low probability high oil resource estimates has increased. For the 5% probability level, the estimate of original endowment has grown by 1.5 trillion barrels. Petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf are shown in Table 4 .
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The dominant position of the Persian Gulf countries is evident. The region holds 76% of known reserves and 54% of estimated total remaining resources. The uniquely low production costs in the Persian Gulf (at about $5 per barrel, compared with $20-25 per barrel for new fields in the U.S. and Europe) multiplies the importance of this region. Tables 5 and 6 illuminate the U.S. situation. U.S. imports are growing rapidly at about 4% annually. This is partly due to rising U.S. consumption, which is now approaching 8 billion barrels per year. 7 But even in the hypothetical case of stabilized U.S. consumption, imports (less exports) must continue to grow because of the declining production in Alaska and in the lower 48 states. Oil production in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge would be costly in both economic and environmental terms, and would only slow (not reverse) this trend of growing imports. Table 6 shows the 13 leading sources of U.S. petroleum imports. China is the only major oil producer that does not export petroleum to the U.S. (China is also a net importer).
Eight of the thirteen countries listed in Table 6 are now involved in war or major internal conflict. Appendix A lists all of the 67 companies importing crude oil into the U.S. in 2002, with their total imports and imports from the Persian Gulf. Given the broad corporate network that handles world trade in crude and products, major production losses in any one exporting country do not necessarily cause significant near term supply problems for importing countries. (British Petroleum, owner of 80% of Prudhoe Bay production, is not considered a major importer because it produces U.S. oil for use in the U.S.)
But, in the long run, as U.S. and world oil consumption continue to grow, the role of the Persian Gulf countries will increase in importance, both in terms of quantity and value. The U.S.
including Alaska is past its production peak. North Sea production is probably at its maximum.
In contrast, the Persian Gulf has produced a much smaller proportion of its original endowment (11%) than the U.S. (38%): see Table 4 . Notes: Each entry includes both crude oil and petroleum products. Consumption includes small amounts of ethanol.
Source: EIA (2004b). 1. Imports are overwhelmingly crude oil rather than products or natural gas liquids. 2. Asterisk denotes the authors' judgment of existence of severe current or potential internal conflicts. 3. Percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding error.
Source: EIA (2004).

VI. The $75 Trillion Prize: Roads to the Future
For the past two decades, the problems of production and price stability have been addressed by the reciprocal arrangement that constituted the target price band. Persian Gulf countries maintained stable oil output and prices and, in return, their Western allies provided military security (for example, the U.S and European militaries helped turn back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990). Today, the price framework is facing major difficulties due to the unstable military and political situation in Iraq (and to some extent in Saudi Arabia). Political instability, the spread of conventional (and nuclear) weapons, and the growing ferocity of the military conflicts and terrorist activities in, or originating in, the Persian Gulf are indicative of a breakdown of civil authority in the region. This has affected the coordination necessary for the effective management of production and prices and destabilized the price framework in the near Any global policy that leaves Persian Gulf nations undefended invites future aggression from within or outside the region, with the goal of that aggression to seize and hold oil wealth.
Thus a "hands-off" policy that relies on self-government and sovereignty for each country in this region is unlikely to succeed in the future. 9 Of course, such aggression is not an immediate threat today, but the prize remains, and the countries of this region continue to amass weaponry.
Can the U.S. provide the necessary security? The U.S. has demonstrated military strength that is clearly adequate to deter or defeat any Persian Gulf nation or regional power that might consider the pursuit of Gulf oil. However, the presence of American armed forces on all 13 of Iran's borders is a major concern. The acquisition of nuclear weapons will appeal to some in Iran's leadership as a means to deter possible U.S. invasion. For Russia, China, and perhaps France, the maintenance or expansion of nuclear weapons capability will seem a potential counterweight to growing American power. Overall, an American security framework in the Persian Gulf is likely to expand rather than reduce weapons capabilities (conventional and nuclear), regionally and globally.
A unilateral approach suffers from serious economic and political defects. The major consumers of Persian Gulf oil include Europe, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. As long as the U.S. (and to a lesser extent the U.K.) manage security, these countries are able to free-ride and have no incentive to participate in security measures. 10 But the U.S. will experience considerable difficulty in attaining legitimacy as the sole influence on the governing authority in Iraq.
An international security framework would have some potential advantages. Given the success experienced from 1986 to 2003 with the price range system, an international approach ought to be able to manage stable oil production and prices, and generate sufficient revenues for Gulf governments. With participation from the U.S. and others, it would be able to deter wars of appropriation of Gulf oil. As an international group, it would be well placed to forestall control of the region's oil by any security providers in the international organization. In contrast to a unilateral system, a multilateral system would have lesser problems with legitimacy, both internationally and in the Gulf region itself.
However, any important and successful international structure must have the U.S. taking a leadership role. U.S. participation must be significant both militarily and organizationally.
The military dimension could perceivably be patterned after NATO. As with NATO, a Persian Gulf Organization would include major military powers, and also nations that see themselves as in need of military protection. Potential participants would be the 8 Persian Gulf States, the U.S., the U.K., China, France, Japan, Germany, Russia, and perhaps members from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. It might be financed by a tax on oil exported from the Gulf.
Such revenues (both tax revenue and revenue from export oil sales) could be allocated to Gulf
States, and also utilized to support the military forces employed to protect and stabilize the Persian Gulf.
Insuring popular support for Persian Gulf governments is particularly challenging. If the goal is stable global oil markets at reasonable prices, then there is logical motivation to encourage the democratization of governments in the Gulf. Yet the understandable U.S. quest for democratization in the region appears to have been set back by the reaction to the Iraqi occupation, itself an effort at democratization. A still different outcome might be that democracy and elections in some Gulf countries could bring to power governments fundamentally opposed to the U.S. and its allies. As discussed above, Al Qaeda's political support is based upon its fervent opposition to Gulf monarchies, American influence, and secularism. A security system linked to a continuation of the monarchies would seem to accelerate popular support for Al Qaeda-type policies and actions. (Perhaps unexpectedly, a Defense Science Board report makes a similar observation (p. 36).)
The international political difficulties surrounding the issues of Iraqi weapons, inspection, disarmament, and occupation all indicate the problems to be encountered in establishing an international system. There is no certainty that an international structure is feasible. On the other hand, a unilateral framework is even less likely to contain the growing instability throughout the Gulf region. What is needed is a rethinking of the global role of Persian Gulf oil, and the significance of democracy (and its absence) to the security of the region. This paper has not provided definitive answers, but has raised what we believe to be useful questions. 
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